This paper addresses one major cause for large uncertainties in human reliability analysis (HRA) results, that is, an absence of detailed function, task, timeline, link and human vulnerability analyses. All too often this crucial step in the HRA process is done in a cursory fashion using word of mouth or written procedures which themselves may incompletely or inaccurately represent the human action sequences and human error vulnerabilities being analyzed. The paper examines the potential contributions these detailed analyses can make in achieving quantitative and qualitative HRA results which are: (1) creditable, that is, minimally uncertain, (2) auditable, that is, systematically linking quantitative results and qualitative information from which the results are derived, (3) capable of supporting root cause analyses on human reliability factors determined to be major contributors to risk, and (4) capable of repeated measures and being combined with similar results from other analyses to examine HRA issues transcending individual systems and facilities. Based on experience analyzing test and commercial nuclear reactors, and medical applications of nuclear technology, an iterative process is suggested for doing detailed function, task, timeline, link and human vulnerability analyses using documentation reviews, open-ended and structured interviews, direct observations, and group techniques. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is that detailed analyses performed in this manner by knowledgeable human factors practitioners, can contribute significantly to the credibility, auditability, causal factor analysis, and combining goals of the HRA.
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, managers and operators of complex high reliability facilities (e.g., aerospace, military, nuclear) are being required to demonstrate that their safety margin, or safety envelope, is sufficient to justify risks that might accrue to the general public and personnel operating these facilities. The most commonly used method for assessing the safety margin is the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Results of primary interest from conducting the PRA relate to the likelihood that the safety margin might be exceeded, therefore causing accidents, and consequences of these accidents to life and property,
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Aerospace, military and nuclear facilities are primarily =io-technical in nature, that is, are made up of three components: equipment, personnel, and operating characteristics (e.g., policies, practices, and operating procedures). Equipment and personnel act individually and in combination in accordance with the latter operating characteristics. As such, all three system components, individually and in combination, are of concern to the PRA. In the past, however, PRA focused primarily on the equipment and operating characteristics of the facility. Systems analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) provide the basis for understanding the facility equipment and its vulnerabilities. The results of these analyses are used to develop logic or facility process models with which to analyze pertinent event sequences for their risk likelihood.
More recently, PRAs have attempted to look more closely at the personnel component. This has been brought about primarily by a recognition of the crucial role human error has played in major accidents involving these facilities (e.g., Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl). [Ref. I] portion of the PRA is commonly referred to as the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Detailed systems analysis and FMEA are crucial for understanding and analyzing equipment operability and vulnerability. Complementary function, task, timeline, link, and human vulnerability analyses provide the basis for integrated logic or facility process models for analyzing more completely, the individual and combined effects of equipment, personnel, and facility operating characteristics. A proper, and defensible application of any HRA technique is not possible without accurate and complete information on the human task actions and action sequences being assessed, obtainable from detailed function, task, timeline, link, and human vulnerability analyses.
Auditahility -An HRA must be well documented and traceable for the results to be practical and defensible. All steps, assumptions, information, and methods relevant to the analysis must be presented in detail, to allow a reviewer to understand the origin, understand the specific context, and assess the meaning of the results. Function, task, timeline, link, and human vulnerability analyses are used to identify and assess the relevant variables and influences upon which the HRA results are based. Appropriate and well documented analyses define much of the basic information used to perform the HRA. The information from these analyses become part of the HRA, and are linked to HRA results through complete documentation of the process, assumptions, and methods used to generate quantitative estimates or qualitative assessments. HRA is not traceable when these analyses are not done, or are not well documented. Auditability of the HRA, including these analyses, is essential to support further assessments of factors contributing to risk, and to allow comparison with other HRAs.
Sunnort analysis of contrihutine factors to risk -Scientists well trained in the scientific method at best, raise a suspicious eyebrow, and at worst, scream "patently ridiculous" when confronted with the phrase "root cause". Some might point to the Big Bang as the cause of modem events, but the aforementioned scientists would suggest those holding that view have not investigated enough. However, scientific inquiry may discover important correlations between events, and scientific and less rigorous methods may suggest contributing factors and precursors to events. The iterative process presented below can provide a sound technical base for responding to each of the HRA requirements outlined in the previous section of this paper. The document review gives the analyst an overview of the facility and an understanding of the human actions and action sequences that are actually used by the staff. The open-ended interviews, along with the facility's operating procedures are of great help in developing an outline of the functions, tasks, and subtasks that should be performed as part of each operating procedure. Once the outline of the functions, tasks, and subtasks has been completed, directed interviews help fill in any gaps in the understanding of the human actions and action sequences that make up the function/tasks/subtasks and help the analyst to understand the performance shaping factors (PSFs) that measurably impact either positive or negative performance of the functions/tasks/suhtasks. Direct observations and table-top discussions are very useful in showing the interactions between individuals responsible for each function/task/subtask and furthering the understanding of the PSFs. Organizing resulting functionltasklsubtask information on a time grid, and presenting pictorially the interfaces among personnel, actions, and equipment, and their frequency, help the analyst visualize circumstances where institutional factors (e.g., management, organizational culture) might have their greatest impact on performance. Finally, screening for error vulnerability provides the analyst a rank ordering of human task actions and action sequences for consideration during later segments of the HRA.
Information for these analyses is sought from a wide variety of sources to ensure a complete and accurate picture of how functions and tasks are actually performed. Frequently, facility documentation is incomplete or out of date, and/or personnel have differing perceptions of how the functions and tasks of interest are supposed to be executed. Only by sampling all, or at least a representative mix of facility information sources, can credible representations of these functions and tasks be achieved.
Function/Task Analvsis -The function analysis characterizes human involvement within the content of a total event sequence. It is a step-by-step representation of an event using flow chart diagrams and narrative descriptions. As such, it is much like a systems analysis used for facility equipment. The focus of the analysis is the event sequence. Equipment and human tasks (e.g., activate pump, open/close valve) and conditions under which these tasks are performed, are described in the sequence in which they occur. There is no attempt to break down human actions below the task level. For HRA, human tasks become the top events of more detailed task analysis. The follow-up task analysis is a step-by-step representation of a human task action sequence also using flow chart diagrams and narrative descriptions. The focus of the analysis is the human task. It is broken down into sub-tasks, and in some cases, hierarchical elements of those sub-tasks. [Ref. 6] 
What is the functiodtask, its product, and importance? (This must be defined in detail)
What tasks are to be performed in order for the facility to progress from the current state to the goal state? How critical is the task in order to achieve the goal state? [3] 492 [3] Workplace layout
To answer these questions the function/task analysis should fully exploit five iterative steps. They include: (1) Reviewing pertinent facility documents, (2) Conducting non-directedlopen-ended interviews with subject matter experts, (3) Conducting directed interviews with operators, (4) Directly observing the function/task, and (5) Organizing the information in a consistent, usable fashion. Terminology and illustrations presented in the following paragraphs are common to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities.
(1) Review pertinent facility documents.
[a] Operating procedures provide a starting point. If the current procedures are verbal, then interviews should be set up with the individuals using the procedures in order to document them as thoroughly as possible.
[b] Facility policies, guidance documents, and standards provide information about the safety and administrative requirements to which the facility needs to conform.
[c] Documents related to the administration of the facility (e.g., policy statements and organizational charts) provide information concerning how the facility is operated and who controls the various organizations within the facility.
[d] Operation and Maintenance Logs provide information about how the facility actually operates and provides information about the frequency of the functionltask of interest. Also, these documents show how the facility has been maintained.
[e] Accident/Incident Reports provide information about the events the facility has had related to the functionltask of interest, and how they were handled.
[fJ A previous PRA, if one exists for the facility, provides information on the function/task and the inherent risks associated with the facility. It may also contain information about human tasks and associated error likelihood estimates.
[g] Piping and instrumentation diagrams provide an overview of the equipment that k i n the facility. The most up-to-date drawings should he selected. As-built drawings should be reviewed by system experts and updated prior to using.
[ Initial flow chart diagrams and narratives describing the functionltask are the products of this step. The flow chart diagram shows the tlow of the functionltask and the respective states of the facility. An example of a typical flow chart diagram that can be used for this purpose is shown in Figure 1 . The function/task narrative is a written description of the functiodtask. Contained in this narrative are the answers to the questions contained in Table 1 . The flow chart diagram and functionhk narrative are revised and refined after each succeeding step of the function/task analysis. 
Function performers (operators of the systems involved)
The process for conducting the interviews is as follows:
[a] Interviews are done with only one interviewee at a time.
[b] Each interviewee is given a new set of flow chart diagrams, which are the functionltask narrative and piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs), that heishe can mark up.
[c] The individual should be allowed to select particular diagrams helshe wishes to annotate (non-directedlopen-ended).
[d] and functionltask narrative should be collected for comparison and consolidated with those of other interviewees.
As each interview is completed the annotated diagrams
[e] questions personnel might bring up during the interview functionltask.
Informal walk-downs of the system can help to resolve any [fl associated functionltask narrative sheet cannot be achieved, it may be necessary to convene a meeting with some of the interviewees to achieve a consensus. The process for conducting the interviews is as follows:
[a] The interviewee should have a copy of the revised flow chart diagram($ and associated functionltask narrative, for specific functions for which he/she is responsible.
[b] completeness and accuracy of the flow chart diagrams and functionltask narrative. These questions should be developed from inconsistencies noted between flow chart diagrams and functionltask narrative developed from the documentation reviews and from the non-directed interviews.
The interviewee is asked specific questions concerning the
[c] The interviewee should also be asked (if possible) to supply information about what could happen to the functionltask state if the human actions were done incorrectly or if the actions were ineffective. This information will also be used in the human vulnerability analysis described below.
[d] If a consensus on a particular flow chart diagram and associated functionltask narrative cannot be achieved, it may be necessary to convene a meeting with some of the interviewees to achieve a consensus.
The products of this step are flow chart diagrams and functionltask narratives, modified and expanded as necessary to reflect the findings from the directed interviews.
(4) Directly observe the functionltask being performed using walk-downs, simulator runs, and tabletop discussions.
Walkdowns should be conducted as follows:
[a] Groups of appropriate personnel, rather than individuals, should be brought together to walk-down each function utilizing, correcting and expanding affected flow chart diagrams and the function narrative emerging from earlier directed interviews.
[b] in the facility, and with any other groups walking down the functionltask narrative, to ensure no loss of information.
Analysts should be stationed in the control room (if any),
[c] and corrected before continuing.
Any problems found during this process should be noted
[d] functionltask narrative should also note equipment labels, equipment locations, lighting, ancillary equipment needed to perform the action, special safety precautions, and equipment actuation indicators.
The personnel walking down the flow chart diagrams and
[e] labels to determine if any mismatches exist.
Equipment labels should be checked against control room
Simulator runs should be conducted on facility simulators and entail observing simulations of the function/task of interest. There should be a number of simulator runs for this scenario including runs that are "real-time" and runs in which the alarm event scenario is "stepped through." The following functionltiisk information should be collected. 
Information about how the operating crews interact
[b] At the end of the run, the observer should ask crew members about their performance in terms of problems the crew had in getting the plant to the goal state and to allow the crew to voice concerns about the steps of the procedure. Table- top discussions should be conducted as follows:
[a] Operating crews and others responsible for performing each function/task are assembled and provided copies of the refined flow chart diagrams and narratives.
[b] event as if they were responding to it in real life.
Crews and others are then asked to discuss the alarm [c] Information gained from table-top discussions of the event is not as in-depth LIS that gained from simulator runs because the information about crew physical interactions is not available.
The products of this step are revised flow chart diagrams and function/task narratives; modified and expanded as necessary to reflect the findings from the direct observations, simulator sessions, and table-top discussions.
(5) Organize the function/task information in a consistent, usable fashion.
At this point flow chart diagram and narratives should be organized to illustrate: (1) the juxtaposition of functions, tasks, and subtasks along a time grid, and (2) interfaces among personnel, actions, and equipment responsible for each, and the strengths (frequency) of these interfaces.
[a] a time grid (including plant response times) to highlight sequential and parallel ordering of tasks or lower level units of analysis, and timing between those units of analysis. rRef.81 Time line analysis charts are usually constructed with time on the horizontal axis and the listing of tasks on the vertical axis. The time estimates associated with a task are indicated by bar graphs beginning at the start of the task and ending when the tasks are completed. For the purposes of producing a functionhk narrative, a time line analysis can be used to determine whether there is sufficient staff to perform the procedure, when various tasks will start and be completed, and when staff will be available to perform other tasks. Figure 2 shows a segment of a timeline analysis for a medical application of nuclear technology.
Timeline Analysis organizes a functionltask analysis along Table   A human vulnerability analysis should be conducted as follows:
[a] with a great depth of knowledge about the functionhk are assembled, and provided copies of the completed function/task flow chart diagrams and narratives.
A team of facility operators, system engineers, and others
The team screens likelihoods (e.g., assigns rough error probability estimates, rank orders relative to one another) that human errors that could be committed across all human task actions and action sequences are identified as part of the function/task analysis. The three basic types of human errors that should be considered are: For each task action and action sequence the following Functionltask human action or action sequence identifier.
Purpose of the human action or action sequence.
Potential human error.
Effect of the error on the system or facility.
Method of detecting the error.
Any environmental conditions that can influence the human error.
o Contingency actions that can be taken to mitigate the effects of the human error. Figure 4 shows how human vulnerability analysis information can be documented in tabular form. The information can also be displayed in narrative form. 
CONCLUSIONS

